Case 10

Crisis First 24 Hours

Scenario

You are Head of Operations at a regional hospital group. A data centre fault overnight has taken the appointment booking system offline across three sites. Clinics open in two hours.

Why this framework

Uses full PINPOINT because the consequence is higher: adds a professional stance, examples, self-checks, your own review before use, and a plan to tweak and test.

Example context

Invented example. A regional NHS-style hospital trust, Tuesday 06:40. Business continuity plan: if the patient records system is down more than 2 hours, switch to paper downtime procedures; elective theatre lists reviewed by the clinical lead; ambulance diversion decisions sit with the executive on-call; the plan covers pharmacy downtime by manual dispensing from ward stock. IT incident notes (06:30): the electronic patient record is unavailable on all three sites; started about 05:50; cause under investigation; IT will update at 08:00; backup systems status unknown. 14 theatre cases are scheduled before noon and the emergency department is currently at normal volume.

Prompt

Purpose: Help me make and communicate the first decisions for the next 24 hours, for the executive on-call and site managers.

Context: Use the attached business continuity plan as the final word. The incident notes from IT are the latest facts; treat anything not in them as unknown.

Narrow the ask: Give me
1. A situation summary in five lines: known, unknown, next update time.
2. Decisions needed in the next two hours, each with options and what I would be trading off.
3. A short holding message for staff and one for patients.
Stop and ask if the continuity plan does not cover something.

Persona and role: Act as a calm, experienced incident lead. Patient safety comes before convenience. Do not speculate about the cause.

Check your work: For each material claim, label it as [Verified Source], [Inference], [Assumption], or [Unverified]. Cite the source where available. If an unverified or assumed point could materially change the conclusion, flag it for review rather than guessing. Mark any step that the continuity plan does not explicitly support.

Before I use it: I decide, not the AI. I will check the messages with Communications and the clinical lead before release.

Materials (pasted here in place of the attachments):
Invented example. A regional NHS-style hospital trust, Tuesday 06:40. Business continuity plan: if the patient records system is down more than 2 hours, switch to paper downtime procedures; elective theatre lists reviewed by the clinical lead; ambulance diversion decisions sit with the executive on-call; the plan covers pharmacy downtime by manual dispensing from ward stock. IT incident notes (06:30): the electronic patient record is unavailable on all three sites; started about 05:50; cause under investigation; IT will update at 08:00; backup systems status unknown. 14 theatre cases are scheduled before noon and the emergency department is currently at normal volume.

Example output from ChatGPT

Incident Brief: Electronic Patient Record Outage

Tuesday, 06:40 | Executive on-call and site managers | First 24 hours

Active incident - decisions required

Immediate priority: Maintain patient safety while establishing whether the trust can safely continue clinical operations across all three sites.

  1. Situation summary - five lines

[Verified Source] Known: The electronic patient record (EPR) is unavailable across all three sites, beginning approximately 05:50. Source: IT notes, 06:30.

[Verified Source] Known: Fourteen theatre cases are scheduled before noon; emergency department volumes are currently normal. Source: Incident materials.

[Verified Source] Unknown: The cause remains under investigation; backup system availability is unknown. Source: IT notes.

[Inference] Immediate risk: Clinical teams may have difficulty accessing patient information needed for safe care. The actual impact has not been established.

[Verified Source] Next update: IT is scheduled to report at 08:00. Source: IT notes.

  1. Decisions required in the next two hours

Decision window: 06:40–08:40

Decision and authority

Options and trade-offs

Recommended action

  1. Prepare paper downtime procedures [Verified Source: BCP]

Prepare now: uses staff capacity but reduces transition delay. Wait: avoids unnecessary preparation but risks slower activation.

[Inference] Prepare now. Activate at approximately 07:50 if the outage remains unresolved, as the BCP requires after two hours.

  1. Review 14 elective theatre cases [Verified Source: BCP]

Continue suitable cases: protects treatment capacity but requires confirmed safety. Defer affected cases: reduces immediate clinical risk but delays care.

[Inference] Request immediate clinical-lead review. Do not make a blanket cancellation decision without that review.

  1. Consider ambulance diversion [Verified Source: BCP]

Maintain current arrangements: preserves access but may add pressure if services are impaired. Divert: may relieve pressure but moves demand elsewhere.

[Inference] Executive on-call to assess after receiving site-level safety information. Normal ED volume alone does not establish whether diversion is necessary.

  1. Pharmacy continuity [Verified Source: BCP]

Use manual dispensing from ward stock: preserves access to medicines but introduces manual verification and stock-management demands.

[Inference] Prepare the BCP pharmacy procedure and confirm local readiness before implementation.

Decision-critical gaps - review before authorising actions

The supplied continuity plan does not explicitly cover:

[Unverified] Whether backup records can be accessed, and how patient identity, allergies and medication histories can be verified.

[Unverified] The safe operating thresholds for theatres, ED and other clinical services.

[Unverified] The detailed authorisation and verification controls for manual dispensing.

[Unverified] How quickly sites must communicate operational changes or when additional incident escalation is required.

These gaps could materially change clinical decisions. Do not invent procedures or thresholds to fill them. Seek confirmation from the clinical lead and the full approved continuity procedures.

  1. Holding messages Staff message Writing

Subject: EPR service disruption - staff update

[Verified Source] The electronic patient record system is currently unavailable across all three sites.

[Verified Source] IT is investigating and will provide its next update at 08:00.

[Inference] Please report any immediate patient-safety concerns or disruption to essential clinical services to your site manager.

[Verified Source] The business continuity plan provides for paper downtime procedures after an outage exceeding two hours, subject to the outage remaining unresolved.

[Unverified - confirm before release] Further operational instructions will be communicated through local management.

Patient safety remains our priority.

Patient message Writing

Important information about hospital services

[Verified Source] Our electronic patient record system is currently unavailable across our three hospital sites.

[Verified Source] Our technical teams are investigating the issue.

[Inference] This disruption may affect some aspects of your care or appointment.

[Unverified - confirm before release] Please follow the guidance provided by your clinical team and local hospital staff.

We apologise for the uncertainty and will share further information when it has been confirmed.

  1. Immediate executive handover

Time

Action

Owner

06:40–07:00

[Inference] Confirm clinical impact and backup status at each site

Site managers / IT

Before 07:50

[Inference] Prepare paper downtime procedures

Site managers

Before theatre decisions

[Verified Source] Clinical lead reviews elective lists

Clinical lead

07:50

[Verified Source + Inference] Two-hour outage threshold; activate paper procedures if still unavailable

Incident leadership - activation authority not specified

08:00

[Verified Source] Receive next IT update

IT

By 08:40

[Inference] Reassess clinical services, pharmacy readiness and any need for diversion

Executive on-call / clinical lead

Decision ownership: [Verified Source] The clinical lead reviews elective theatre lists; the executive on-call owns ambulance diversion decisions. Other decision owners and escalation authority are not specified in the supplied BCP.

Before issuing these instructions: The executive on-call should confirm the unresolved clinical safety gaps with the clinical lead, and Communications should approve both holding messages. No recovery time or cause has been established.

One essential clarification: Does the full business continuity plan contain a separate clinical downtime or patient-safety escalation procedure? The supplied extract does not cover those operational controls, and they are material to safe decisions.